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ABSTRACT : in the past century, veterans of America's wars have shown extraordinary 
human longevity in the postwar eras. As a result, contemporary public historical 
interpretations of the American second world war experience have been influenced by 
veterans' perceptions of historical issues for a longer time than was true of postwar eras 
before the twentieth centuıy. Public historical debates in the United States have recently 
focused on the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor (1941) and the American attacks on 
Hiroshima and Nagasaki (1945). These events may seem quite dated by now, but they have 
remarkable contemporary resonance in light of debates över proliferation of nuclear weapons 
and tactics of so-called pre-emptive warfare. Though the aerial attacks are often related in 
popular American perception, the truth is they were incommensurate events in terms of their 
military and political objectives, their physical scale and results, and the natures of their 
targets. 
KeywordS : Longevity, veterans, second world war, incommensurate, Hiroshima, Nagasaki, 
Pearl Harbor, nuclear proliferation. 
ÖZET : II Dünya Savaşı gazileri, bu savaşın en önemli iki olayında halk 
hissiyatında büyük bir yer tutmuşlardır: 1941'deki Japonların Pearl Harbor ve 
Amerika'nın 1945'deki Hiroşima saldırıları. Bu çalışma, II Dünya savaş 
döneminden itibaren bu iki saldırının Amerikan kamu oyunda bir benzeri olup 
olmadığını inceler. Bu karşılaştırmada; 1) Japon ve Amerikan saldırılarının 
amaçları; 2) bu saldırıların boyutları; 3) bu saldırıların şekli irdelenmektedir. 
Ancak, tam bir karşılaştırma yapmak olanaksızdır. İronik olarak, Amerika yeni 
küçük bir nükleer silah geliştirmeyi düşünürken, Japon hükümeti, Pearl Harbor 
saldırısında olduğu gibi, potansiyel Kuzey Kore saldırısı korkusuyla caydırıcı 
nükleer programı planlamaktadır. 
Anahtar kelimeler: Gazi, II. Dünya Savası, Eşitsizlik, Hiroşima, Nagasaki, Pearl Harbor, 
Nükleer Silahlanma. 
The old cliche about wars fmally being över after fıfty years was coined before the 
hfetimes of recent generations, who have enjoyed extraordinary human longevity 
brought about by clean environments, healthy foods and improved medical 
technique in the past century. in a report on high incidences of childhood mortaliry 
in sub-Saharan Africa, Geoffrey Cowley says that the cause is not complex. "Most 
die for a lack of clear water, adequate nutrition and the most basic medical 
necessities. . . ." (Cowley, 2003 : 48) in the West before 1945, it could be assumed 
that eldest soldiers who had fought in a war would have departed this vale of tears 
about half a century aftenvards at most. That is clearly not the case with large 
numbers of American veterans of the Second World War. Dates of the start of this 
war vary from 1937 in East Asia to 1939 in western Europe and to 1941 in the 
124 Leo J. MAHONEY 
western hemisphere. For the United States armed forces, the war began on Sunday 
morning, December 7, 1941, in Hawaii. 
As for longevity of the war's survivors, we may çite as an example the not unusual 
case of Thomas Ferebee (1918-2000), the unapologetic bombardier who aimed the 
atomic bomb dropped from the Enola Gay B-29 aircraft on Hiroshima on August 6, 
1945 (Fountain, 2000 : 10; "Warning to Revisionists" : 9B). From the other end of 
the American war, December 7, 1941, during December, 2001, a group of survivors 
traveled to Havvaii for 60* anniversary commemorative ceremonies there. Of course, 
this celebration occurred only three months after terrorist attacks on the Twin 
Towers in New York City and on the Pentagon in Washington, DC. Partly as a 
consequence, "the old men of Pearl Harbor . . . were applauded ali week in airport 
departure lounges, beatifıed by pilots in mid-flight monologues, and pestered for 
autographs in Honolulu hotel lobbies" (Hardin, 2001 : 1). 
The partially medically induced longevity of military veterans has produced an 
important social impact on our times. Unusually large numbers of aged citizens, 
whose geriatric health çare is a growing fmancial burden on proportionally smaller 
cadres of the young, is one such effect (Izard, 1998 : 3). Another, perhaps more 
tumultuous, consequence is the attenuation of politically potent warbred emotions 
into a long future. This is no minör issue. There are stili almost fıve million living 
American veterans of World War II (Sciolino, 2001 : 2). The total number of 
American veterans of World War II, and the Korean (1950-1953) and Vietnam 
(1964-1975) wars, now stands at 26 million souls - that is, voters - hardly a statistic 
to be ignored by democratic politicians ("Glory Days," 2003 : 47). 
On the fıftieth anniversary of the American military victories över Germany and 
Japan, severe controversy marked aspects of the commemoration of one of the 
events called VJ (Victory över Japan) Day. At the time, in 1995, an imaginative, 
revisionist Smithsonian Institution exhibition about the war with Japan was hastily 
dismantled under outraged public pressures, emanating especially from veterans of 
the war ("A Very Misguided Exhibit," 1994 : 4B). in the same year, issuance of an 
American postage stamp depicting an atomic bomb's familiar mushroom cloud was 
canceled in order to assuage angry Japanese sensibility, an act which also caused an 
outcry among organized veterans' groups in the United States ("White House Backs 
Japan on A-Bomb Stamp," 1994 : 16A). Taking advantage of the hoopla, politicians, 
veterans and some journalists, in both America and Japan, essayed simplistic and 
occasionally crude commentaries about the Japanese-American war of 1941-1945 
("ClaptrapDistortionofHistory," 1995 : 11B). 
The aftereffects of the controversies of 1995 have been lasting. As late as six years 
after the fıftieth anniversary of VJ Day, a legislative proposal to rename the state of 
Maine's coastal turnpike after the popular American president, Ronald Reagan, 
failed of approval because the road was already designated as a "Gold Star 
Memorial Highway" in honor of those mothers from Maine whose sons had died in 
World War II (Slevin, 2001 : 8). Two years later, in March, 2003, an exhibit of an 
artist's nature photographs were moved to a basement floor of one of the 
Smithsonian's museums after they were mentioned in a United States Senate debate 
on wildlife protection (Bailey, 2003 : 8). 
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By contrast, commemorations of the stili controversial American war with Vietnam 
do not seem to arouse much public debate in the United States, though Maya Lin's 
Vietnam Veterans Memorial in Washington, DC, initially stirred a storm of 
controversy ("Even Enemy Is Represented at Vietnam Art Museum," 2001 : 15; 
Knowlton, 2003 : 20). The deeply unpopular war with Vietnam is hardly a vaunted 
American success story and, in fact, it was marked by severe social and political 
schisms in the United States during its course from 1964 to 1975. Yet, the American 
Civil War of 1861-1865, surely a highly divisive conflict in its own time, is stili a 
focus of emotional controversy even after almost 140 years have passed. For 
example, in November, 2001, Robin Reed, director of the Museum of the 
Confederacy, in Richmond, Virginia, was pressurized to resign because he had 
supported an exhibit "presenting Confederate, black and Union veterans of the War 
Between the States under one all-inclusive, all-tolerant roof. As one of Reed's 
museological colleagues explained, "Robin wasn't pro-Southern enough. His taking 
a balanced approach in his own exhibits disturbed members of his [museum's 
executive]board"(Clines,2001:18). 
Pro-Confederate sympathizers in the southern United States are not alone in their 
partisan outlooks. During the past few years, in Japan, sanitized histories of the 
country's brutal actions in China and in southeast Asia, during the late 1930s and 
early 1940s, have found their way into students' textbooks. There is, however, 
demonstrably less interest in the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor, in 1941, if the 
lukewarm reactions to (an equally sanitized version for Japanese of) Hollywood's 
film, Pearl Harbor, is an accurate indicator (Woollacott, 2001 : 8; French, 2001 : 1, 
4; "Japan History Textbook Selis Briskly," 2001 : 10). 
Not surprisingly, public contretemps in the United States över the war with Japan 
have focused on the highly charged events marking the war's beginning and its 
ending - that is, the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor in December, 1941, and the 
American atomic attacks on Hiroshima and Nagasaki in August, 1945. Though 
public interest in the Pearl Harbor attack has ahvays eclipsed interest in the 
Hiroshima and Nagasaki bombings, Hollywood's efforts of spring, 2001, to boost its 
film about the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor and, especially, the spectacular 
events of September 11, 2001, have marked a new appreciation of the Pearl Harbor 
story in the United States (Cagle, 2001 : 63-64; Scott, 2001 : 24). 
in spite of the greater public interest in Pearl Harbor, many Americans view the Japanese 
attack of 1941, and the American bombings of Hiroshima and Nagasaki in 1945, as 
psychologically related. For instance, an American veteran of the war with Japan was 
quoted in Liftle Rock's Arkamas Democrat-Gazette, on August 8, 1995, as saying he 
thought "the world would be berter off if, while the charred bodies of the American sailors 
were stili smoldering in the sunken battleships of Pearl Harbor, we could have dropped a 
hundred a-bombs on Japan". in the same commemorative issue of the newspaper, another 
writer, less excitedly but just as pointedly, connected the 1941 Japanese attack on Pearl 
Harbor to the American atomic bomb attacks on Hiroshima and Nagasaki four years later. 
"The Japanese were warned (at Potsdam in July, 1945)" wrote this knowledgeable 
American veteran and prisoner of war. "Pearl Harbor was not." Then, too, in a distinctly 
unfhendly review of the 2001 American film, Pearl Harbor, even a British critic, Peter 
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Bradshaw, asked rhetorically, "Is producer Jerry Bruckheimer going to hint at a big historical 
truth: that Pearl Harbor led to Hiroshima and Nagasaki?" (Bradshaw, 2001 : viii). 
Perhaps producer Bruckheimer was disinclined to emphasize an imagined link in 
American thinking between Japan's nefarious surprise attack on Pearl Harbor, in 
1941, and a vindictive American atomic retaliation in Japan, in 1945, because the 
relation was clearly characteristic of popular American attitudes towards the war 
with Japan, even as the 60th anniversary of the Pearl Harbor assault approached in 
2001. Robert Mcllvaine has shown that the vengeful nuclear response to Pearl 
Harbor's destruction is childish , while lan Buruma has pointed out that the most 
important Japanese film about Pearl Harbor, made in 1942, did not villify the 
American enemy (Mcllvaine, 1997 : A10; Buruma, 2001 : 3). in contrast, "The 
feeling in America, now, as it was then," said Professor Donald M. Goldstein of the 
University of Pittsburgh, "is that World War II was a good war. There was a truly 
evil enemy, and we were the good guys" ("Hollywood Varies Its Views on World 
War II," 2001 : 2). At the time, in 1945, Americans believed that Japan deserved 
whatever devastation came to it on account of what President Franklin D. Roosevelt 
had called its "unprovoked and dastardly attack" on Pearl Harbor in December, 
1941 (Blum in C. Vann Woodward, 1968 : 317). Many elderly Americans, however, 
harbor the same attitude towards Japan today. "Seeing ali these people, it's like 
coming home again," remarked Yuell Chandler, 83, who was present at Pearl 
Harbor on December 7, 1941. "I wish ali them guys that's in the [USS] Arizona 
[sunk on that day] was up here instead of me. Ali the thousands that got shot up that 
day. it was a mess" ("Disney Launches 'Pearl Harbor' Blockbuster on Navy 
Aircraft Carrier," 2001 : 2; "Pearl Harbor Survivors Have Mixed Reaction to Movie, 
"2001:2). 
By now, almost a decade after the emotional polemics of the golden anniversary of 
VJ Day, in 1995, it is tempting to try to make a less passionate and more detached 
analysis of the Japanese and American aerial assaults on each other's territories in 
1941 and 1945, respectively. in fine, the rhetorical weather may be suffıciently calm 
at this time - just before another storm arises, perhaps, in 2005 - to permit judicious 
inquiry into the question of whether the American bombings of Hiroshima and 
Nagasaki and the Japanese bombing of Pearl Harbor were actually commensurate 
events. 
The facts are unsettling. Despite the persistence of rather crude retributive moral 
perceptions in the United States, the Japanese and American attacks of 1941 and 
1945 were not commensurable events when calmly measured by important 
differences between them in (1) their military and political objectives, (2) the 
physical scale and results of the attacks, and in (3) the nature of their targets. An 
analysis of these three distinctive features is both revealing and provocative. 
First, as to the different military objectives of the two attacks, it is certainly the case 
that the atomic bombings of Hiroshima and Nagasaki were carried out in order to 
convince the imperial war cabinet in Tokyo that continued resistance to American 
arms would result in the reduction of Japanese civilization to radioactive rubble. it is 
also arguably the case that President Harry S Truman's incidental political objective 
in ordering the atomic attacks on the two Japanese cities was to demonstrate to 
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Soviet Generalissimo Josef Stalin a determined will to power in East Asia on the 
part of Truman's new American administration (Alperovitz, 1995; Norton, et. al., 
1994 : 844-845). 
By contrast, the Japanese aerial assault on Pearl Harbor was, in actual fact, the 
specifıc military objective against the United States of the Japanese government in 
December, 1941. Politically, the Japanese attack was mounted to retard or 
discourage the United States government from an active military participation 
against Japan in its war in China and with British, French, and Dutch colonial 
territories in Asia ("Need for Resources Led Japanese to Attack on Pearl Harbor," 
2001 : 2). Incidentally, the Japanese attacks on American territory in December, 
1941, demonstrated to Stalin - then at war with Adolf Hitler's German armies since 
June, 1941 - that Japan's imperial interests did not threaten the Soviet empire in 
Asia. But the important fact about the objectives of the Japanese conventional aerial 
attack of December, 1941, and the American atomic bombings of August, 1945, is 
that the latter amounted to threats of genocide (national extinction) of Japan, while 
the former was limited to traditional military and political aims. James Carroll has 
pointed out that the Americans' use of atomic bombs on Hiroshima and Nagasaki 
signaled that "ultimately ali of Japan would be transformed into a radioactive 
wasteland" if the Japanese government refused to surrender (1997 : Al3). Recently, 
North Korea's irascible regime has claimed it possesses nuclear weapons and the 
balhstic means to deliver them. Certainly, America's ostentatious naval posturings 
and its constraints on North Korea's illicit trading in drugs and weapons and fake 
currency have given the North Koreans a chance to put on a show of their nuclear 
prowess (Weisman, 2003 : İA, 10A). If Pyongyang should decide to stage a nuclear 
demonstration somewhere in the western Pacific ocean, that action-propaganda 
would certainly stand in marked contrast to the American decision of August, 1945, 
to actually employ atomic weapons in battle (Jae-Suk Yoo, 2003 : 8; "North Korea 
Hardens Stance onNukes," 2003 : 9). 
A second important comparison shows that the scale of the two separate and 
devastating attacks, in 1941 and 1945, also differed signifıcantly. The Americans' 
atomic blasts över Hiroshima and Nagasaki took the lives of as many as 250,000 to 
300,000 Japanese citizens between 1945 and 1947. Pathological and genetic damage 
in succeeding generations of Japanese is a technical matter of continuing debate. 
However, it is an indisputable fact that most of the Japanese casualties of the two 
atomic attacks of August, 1945, were civilians living in the two cities that were 
destroyedby the atomic bombs. 
Reports of the total numbers of American casualties from the Japanese bombing of 
Pearl Harbor vary slightly. One reputable source puts the number of American 
casualties at 2,403 dead and 1,178 wounded, along with destruction of or damage to 
eight battleships and 160 aircraft. These fıgures include 49 civilians killed and 83 
wounded ("Pearl Harbor," 1978 : 457; Norton, et. al., 1994 : 812). 
To a great degree, although not entirely so, the difference in scale of the Japanese 
and American bombardments is equivalent in magnitude to the seismic difference in 
the military and scientifıc technologies employed by the two antagonists' air forces, 
navies and technological and industrial establishments, in 1941 and 1945, 
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respectively. Although Japanese scientists knew about the potential military utility 
of atomic fıssion, neither their laboratories nor their industrial facilities were even 
minimally adequate to the gargantuan enterprise of producing an atomic bomb 
during the Second World War (Mahoney, 1981 : 389). Nor would any but 
conventional weapons of the day have been needed by the Japanese air forces to 
cripple American battleships and airplanes at their Hawaiian bases in 1941. 
Thirdly, in attempting a judicious comparison of these infamous, hostile attacks of 
long ago, it is instructive to consider the essential differences in the nature of their 
respective targets. in their atomic attacks on Japan, in August, 1945, through the 
additional force of atomic blasts and radiation aftereffects, the Americans' 
destruction of Hiroshima and Nagasaki amounted to qualitatively radical extensions 
of the devastating so-called saturation bombings of big cities begun by Japanese 
pilots, at Shanghai, and German air squadrons, at Guernica, in 1937. The Germans 
then dealt out the same fates to Warsaw (1939) and Rotterdam (1940). The United 
States and British air forces went on to perfect aerial saturation bombing över 
Germany itself after 1942 (Hamburg, Dresden, Nuremberg, Schweinfürt, Berlin), 
and on Japan, in 1944 and 1945, with dreadful physical consequences for civilian 
targets. in a report to the U. S. Manhattan Project's atomic bomb target committee, 
in April, 1945, an American military offıcer noted that "it should be remembered 
that .. the 20* An Force ıs operatıng pnmanly to [sıc] laymg waste ali the mam 
Japanese cities. . . . The 20* An Force is systematıcally bombing out the followmg 
cities with the prime purpose of not leaving one stone lying upon another : Tokyo, 
Yokohama, Nagoya, Osaka, Kyoto, Kobe, Yawata, & Nagasaki" (Rhodes in Stross, 
ed., 1989 : 174-175). The 20th Air Force's efforts were successful. lan Buruma 
recalls "Majör General Curtis LeMay, who gloated that 100,000 people in Tokyo 
had 'scorched and boiled and baked to death in one night' of conventional American 
saturation bombing raids" (Buruma, 2001 : 3). 
According to Andrew Gordon, in 1944-1945, some nine million Japanese civilians 
were left homeless by the Allies' conventional saturation air raids, and nearly 
200,000 others died in them. As for the American atomic attacks of August, 1945, 
Gordon goes on to say that "Ali human beings within a two-mile radius of the 
[blast's] epicenter were incinerated in an instant. . . . Another one hundred thousand 
or more bomb victims died in the following months and years because of the 
lingering effects of radiation sickness" (2003 : 255). These horrifıc effects are not 
likely to be repeated if current (2003) projections of physical consequences of 
tactical use of miniaturized nuclear weapons should ever be tested in practice 
(Cooper, 2003 : Al8; Broad, 2003 : 1, 7; Ramberg, 2003 : 6; Bay, 2003 : Al6). Of 
course, such conditions are stili quite unsettling and it is perhaps important to note 
that American nuclear strategy nowadays bears little relation to the purposes of the 
atomic bombs employed on Japan in August, 1945, as well as to the nuclear 
weapons developed aftenvards during the decades of the Soviet-American nuclear 
arms race. Already by 1958, for example, the United States was tinkering (as it stili 
is) with the idea of nuclear-powered spaceships, and - rather more primitively, 
perhaps - in 1961, the Soviet Union's nuclear scientists and engineers tested a 60-
megaton hydrogen bomb, as a nuclear deterrent, that was fully 6,000 times more 
explosive than the bombs that obliterated Hiroshima and Nagasaki, in 1945 (Dyson, 
2002:2,17;Davidson,2003:A10). 
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Compared to the civilian holocausts of Hiroshima and Nagasaki, a curious irony -
and a suggestive fact - about the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor, in December, 
1941, is that it was a precisely executed surgical strike on American military targets. 
(This şort of tactical effect is exactly what is now being planned for miniature 
nuclear weapons.) Very few civilians were killed and wounded by Japanese aircraft 
över Hawaii in 1941. Additionally, John D. Hays has noted that, despite the 
extensive physical damage and the casualites left behind by Japanese airplanes at 
Pearl Harbor, the Japanese air forces failed to find and destroy some 4.5 million 
barrels of petrol stored in the United States Navy's facilities nearby; Japan's 
admirals thereby lost a good chance to cripple the powerful American aircraft 
carriers in the United States Pacific Fleet and to make re-supply of the Hawaiian 
Islands impossible for several months of 1942 (Hays, 1978 : 483). 
in both of the Second World War attacks examined here, the combatants' short-term 
military objectives were achieved with stunning surprise and sensational success. it 
is equally clear, however, that the longer term political, technological and moral 
consequences of the two kinds of aerial assaults are stili highly debatable. On the 
positive side of the historical ledger, it may well be that the sheer physical and 
human devastation of Hiroshima and Nagasaki, in 1945, has had at least as much to 
do with preserving the world from nuclear war, since then, as the Cold War's more 
melodramatic ballistic balance of terror. it is also true that, in spite of the carnage 
due to the atomic blasts in Japan in 1945, the atomic bomb attacks seemed to 
Americans at the time to be the only way to end a brutally destructive war with 
Japan. According to Ben Bova, "Dr. Taro Takemi, a former president of the Japan 
Medical Association, said in 1983 that 'many people would have starved to death if 
the atomic bomb had not been dropped. . . . When one considers the possibility that 
the Japanese military would have sacrifıced the entire nation if it were not for the 
atomic bomb attack, then the bomb might be described as having saved Japan' " 
(Bova, 1986 : 105). Dr. Takemi's judgement was echoed after the second world war 
by one of Emperor Hirohito's close aides, Koichi Kido, and by Japan's navy 
minister, Mitsumasa Yonai (Kristof, 2003 : 7). 
The lessons of the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor are more rooted in their time but 
no less signifıcant for that, when one considers that the current $10 billion annual 
budget of America's Tactical Intelligence and Related Activities (TIARA) branch of 
the Defense Intelligence Agency is prompted by contemplation of that 1941 event 
(Adams, 1995 : 47). Sadly, the echoes of these long-past concrescent explosions of 
national, racial and cultural pride are stili - occasionally and obdurately - present in 
both the United States and Japan more than half a century after the end of the war 
between them. On Friday, August 1, 2003, Tokyo's poliçe arrested a 22-year-old 
university student whom they suspected of setting fire to thousands of paper cranes 
symbolizing victims of the American atomic bomb attacks of August, 1945 ("in 
Brief, " 2003 : 5). in light of the Japanese government's recent deliberations about 
adopting a nuclear deterrent capability against possible North Korean attack, the 
student's vandalism may have been a harbinger of things to come (Kageyama, 2003 
: A15; "At Hiroshima Rite, Fears of a New Nuclear Age" : 5). 
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